Introduction
Credit backed by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is very tight. Lenders often blame the tight credit box and their reluctance to extend credit to any less-than-pristine borrower on uncertainty about the lender's exposure to repurchase requests based on the representations and warranties they provide the GSEs. The lender's concern is that if a loan defaults for any reason, the GSE will assert that the default was the result of improper underwriting and "put back"-meaning, require the lender to repurchase-the loan, instead of owning up to the credit guarantee the lender has paid for.
One consequence of this uncertainty is that lenders have become excessively cautious, raising the minimum credit standards they require for making a loan well above what the GSEs require. A second consequence is that for the loans lenders do make, both the lenders and the GSEs believe they need to be compensated for default risk, so the borrowers in essence pay twice for the coverage.
In an effort to reduce this uncertainty, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the GSEs' regulator, directed Fannie and Freddie to introduce a three-year sunset period for most reps and warrants on loans with perfect pay histories. 2 This policy applies to loans the GSEs purchased after January 1, 2013.
Under the new policy, the lender generally cannot be forced to repurchase the loan if the borrower does not miss a single payment for the first three years. 3 The sunset was coupled with more robust quality control early in the life of the loans. Newly released GSE data 4 has enabled us to go beyond anecdote for the first time and examine several critical questions surrounding put-backs, including the following:
1. How large is the put-back issue?
2. Which loans are most apt to be put back? What is the relationship between put-backs and delinquencies?
3. What is the effect of different sunset periods? That is, how much are the GSEs actually giving up under a three-year sunset? What if the period were reduced further? What if the sunset also covered loans with less-than-perfect pay histories?
We find that put-backs are actually quite small relative to their impact on lender behavior and credit uncertainty. This appears to have magnified the impact of the experience of these vintages and produced an outsized effect on credit availability, as lenders apply credit overlays and particularly strict underwriting standards for higher risk lending.
Our analysis indicates that the GSEs would suffer minimal negative consequences if they implemented a rep and warrant sunset shorter than three years and allowed for loans that have less-than-perfect pay histories; the losses would be even smaller with enhanced up-front due diligence. Such policies would produce greater certainty for lenders, reduce the duplication of charges for bearing credit risk, and encourage an expansion of credit.
How Large Is the Put-Back Issue?
The data in Freddie Mac's new loan-level credit database enable us to discern loans that were put back to lenders and to know whether those loans were put back before or after they became six months delinquent. The Fannie Mae data reveal loans repurchased before they became six months delinquent.
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While the data do not represent the full book of business for either GSE, the loans included are typical of both current and likely future originations: they are 30-year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans with full documentation. The Freddie Mac data cover 16 million loans acquired from 1999 through June 2012, with performance history through December 2012-just over half of Freddie's total mortgage acquisitions during this period. The Fannie Mae database has similar coverage.
This combined database is limited in a few important respects. It does not flag as repurchases loans covered by global settlements, such as those between Freddie Mac and Bank of America. It also excludes many of the loans most likely to be put back: limited-documentation loans, affordability programs, and loans with pool policies. Though the resulting set of loans represents nearly all current lending (full documentation, amortizing), one should not underestimate the impact that the put-back experience with the riskier loans not captured here has had on lender perceptions of their current risk. With the introduction of the three-year sunset and more up-front due diligence, we would expect the portion of current loans being put back to continue to increase. As part of the up-front quality control process, the GSEs are checking some loans electronically upon loan sale, or very quickly thereafter, to ensure that the documentation is in order and that important calculations (such as loan-to-value) are done correctly. The goal is to increase the electronic review to 100 percent so documentation can be corrected at an early stage. 11 This electronic review does not verify the accuracy of loan file contents. The GSEs currently examine the loan file contents on both a random sample of loans as well as a targeted sample of loans. The GSEs are likely to increase the targeted sample of loans by enhancing the models used to identify loans that merit further scrutiny earlier in the review process. No matter which process is used, a corollary of requiring repurchase soon after the loans are sold to the GSEs is that the loans are more likely to be current when put back.
Which Loans Are Most Apt to Be Put Back, According to Freddie Mac Data? Table 2 shows, by vintage, the loan count, original balance, FICO score, LTV, and interest rate on three categories of Freddie Mac loans: those that defaulted (went six months delinquent), those that were repurchased (put-backs), and all loans for the vintage. For originations before 2009, the average FICO score of the loans that were put back was lower than the average FICO score of the loans that defaulted, the LTVs were higher, and the interest rate was higher. In short, the loans that were put back were more risky than the loans that defaulted. In contrast, for originations in 2009 and later, the characteristics of the loans that were put back were stronger than the characteristics of loans that defaulted.
12 Note that for all vintages, the loans that were repurchased and that defaulted were worse than the total universe of loans.
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Housing Finance Policy Center Thus, before 2009, lower-quality loans had a much higher put-back rate than their higher-quality counterparts; in 2009 and later, there is little difference. Looking at absolute purchase rates is a bit misleading, as repurchases are meant to protect the GSEs against defects in loan manufacturing that are apt to contribute to a default. If underwriting is sloppy, but the borrower is not apt to default, that loan is not likely to be put back. If the borrower actually defaults, the GSEs are likely to scrutinize the loan to see if it can be put back, and since lower-quality loans are more likely to default, it stands to reason they would have absolutely more repurchases. So why we are seeing muted differences in absolute put-back rates in the recent vintages?
We thought it would be illuminating to look at the ratio of repurchases to defaults. Historically, the ratio of repurchases to defaults has been much higher for lower-quality loans; more recently this pattern has been reversed. To confirm our conclusion that there was a dramatic shift in behavior in negative sign. A lower FICO indicates a higher propensity for a loan to be put back relative to its default rate. For the same period, LTV has a positive score, indicating that a higher-LTV loan had a higher propensity to be put back relative to its default rate. In the 2009 and later regressions, the results are reversed. All things equal, in the later years, higher-FICO loans and lower-LTV loans were more apt to be put back (relative to their default rate) than their lower-FICO or higher-LTV counterparts. These results reflect the GSEs doing due diligence earlier in the process. They also strongly suggest that, as a result of the pre-2009 origination put-back experience, lenders have been exercising more due diligence on lower-quality loans (which are more likely to default) than on higher-quality loans (which are less likely to default). This change in behavior is coincident with-and discussions with lenders indicate that this is a partial cause of-the sharp tightening of the credit box. That is, lenders used to take advantage of the entire permissible Freddie/Fannie credit box; now they impose overlays that limit the size of the box. (Clearly the lenders are not the only party limiting the size of the credit box; the mortgage insurance companies impose overlays as well, in the form of both cut offs and pricing. total put-backs). These loans would not have been put back under the new rules. Table 5 2007  77%  50%  10%  3%  81%  57%  13%  3%  87%  63%  17%  4%   2008  69%  40%  7%  1%  75%  46%  9%  1%  83%  53%  13%  2%   2009  87%  70%  10%  0%  88%  73%  11%  0%  91%  76%  12%  0%   2010  70%  41%  19%  0%  72%  42%  20%  0%  75%  45%  20%  0%   2011  56%  4%  0%  0%  57%  4%  0%  0%  58%  4%  0%  0%   Total  70%  43%  13%  5%  75%  48%  15%  5%  83%  55%  18%  6% Sources: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac credit database and Urban Institute calculations. Note: Ratio is calculated as the number of put-backs divided by the total number of loans in each vintage.
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Conclusion
The present system of reps and warrants functions poorly. Both the originators and the GSEs believe they are absorbing the risk of default and need to be compensated. Thus, the borrower is paying twice for rep and warrant protection-once to the originator, once to the GSEs. Under a more rational system, lenders would take the risks that they can control, the balance of the credit risk would be covered by the GSEs, and the GSEs would price for taking the risk. Mistakes in underwriting should belong to the lenders; the GSEs can detect them, in part, through better up-front due diligence, with the sunset period providing further protection. Lenders pay the GSEs to take the borrower's credit risk, and that risk belongs with the GSEs.
One sticky issue in this debate is who bears the credit risk after the loan is made, but before it is closed and delivered to the GSEs. During this period the borrower can lose his job, incur additional debt, or incur other changes in circumstances that affect creditworthiness. We believe the correct answer should be that the GSEs bear that risk, with a limitation on the amount of time that elapses between loan closing and sale to the GSEs. This is not an underwriting issue, but a credit issue, and the GSEs are in a better position to insure the credit risk most efficiently. More important than the correct answer, however, is a clear answer, so originators and the GSEs have a clear understanding of which risks belong to which party.
Shorter sunsets on rep and warrant obligations and a relaxation of the pay history requirement, coupled with more up-front due diligence, is perhaps the best way to create the certainty that lenders are looking for to expand credit. The FHFA is moving Fannie and Freddie in this direction with the January 1, 2013, introduction of a three-year sunset for loans that have perfect pay histories and a greater emphasis on up-front due diligence. We believe that as up-front due diligence efforts further ramp up, the sunset period could be reduced and the pay history restrictions relaxed, at minimal cost to the GSEs. If this is coupled with steps to clarify which parties bear which risk, it would reduce reps and warrants as a significant obstacle to expanding the credit box. 3 Certain "life of the loan" reps and warrants extend beyond three years. These life-of-the-loan reps and warrants are limited to charter matters; product eligibility; clear title/first-lien eligibility; compliance with laws and responsible lending practices; and misstatements, misrepresentations, omissions, and data inaccuracies. The GSEs attempted to give lenders comfort on the last point by requiring a pattern, rather than isolated instances of misstatements and misrepresentations, to justify a request to repurchase. 4 In March 2013, Freddie Mac released loan-level credit data in support of a securities issuance designed to share credit risk with investors; Fannie Mae followed suit in April. This data release was intended to allow investors to build more accurate credit performance models and, hence, develop more confidence in pricing the new securities, which, unlike traditional GSE securities, have embedded credit risk. A nice bonus, however, is that the release provided previously unavailable detailed data on put-backs. 5 The Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae credit databases both eliminate loans from the data when they go six months delinquent or are otherwise terminated. Both datasets include the reason for loan termination, namely voluntary prepayment; 180-day delinquency; and, if it occurred before the loan was 180 days delinquent, loans that were disposed of via short sales, third-party sales, deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure, REO acquisitions, and repurchases. The Freddie Mac dataset contains an additional field capturing loans that exited the database because they went 180 days delinquent but were subsequently repurchased. As a result, the Freddie Mac data enable us to discern loans that (1) were pulled out of the database because they were put back (these would be loans that were less than six months delinquent) and (2) went six months delinquent and were subsequently repurchased. The Fannie Mae dataset flags only loans pulled out because they were repurchased; it does not flag loans that went six months delinquent and were subsequently repurchased. vintages.) We do not view these years as representative of what would be experienced going forward, even in an environment in which prices are declining substantially, because so many loans that were considered full documentation actually had had their documentation waived. In addition, appraisal and occupancy fraud was common on GSE loans. However, this experience does color an originator's perception of the prevalence of put-backs. 7 A 40 percent severity would mean that for $1 of loan balance a lender is required to repurchase, the lender would ultimately, after working with the borrower, selling the loan, or foreclosing, lose 40 cents. Thus, if all lenders were required to repurchase 0.5 percent of the total dollar amount of loans sold to Freddie Mac, they would ultimately lose two-tenths of a cent for each dollar of loans sold, or 20 basis points (.005 x .40 = .002). 8 A lifetime loss of 20 basis points is approximately 4 basis points annually. 9 For Fannie Mae, we don't know the total put-back rate, as we don't have information on loans that were pulled out of the database because they went six months delinquent and were then put back. However, Fannie Mae put-back rates on loans that were pulled out of the database before becoming six months delinquent are similar to Freddie's put-back rates on similar loans, as can be seen in figure A1 in the appendix. To the extent there is a difference, Fannie's pre-six-month put-backs are generally slightly lower than Freddie's put-backs. 10 Table A1 compares the percent of Fannie and Freddie put-backs, where the loan was put back before it became six months delinquent. The share of current loans put back was much higher in the recent vintages for both Fannie and Freddie. We have included this table to show that Fannie's put-back patterns are similar to Freddie's. Since Fannie reports only repurchases before six months delinquent, we show Freddie on the same basis in this table. 11 Again, with the review done early in the process, these targeted loans are likely to be performing; in earlier periods, with more limited up-front due diligence, these loans would not have been reviewed until they defaulted. 12 We can establish these points more definitively by looking at each variable separately. For pre-2009 originations, the average FICO score of the loans put back was lower than the score of those that defaulted; and, the average FICO score of the loans that defaulted was, as expected, lower than the FICO score for the universe. For example, in 2001 the average FICO score in the Freddie universe was 715; it was 663 on the loans that defaulted and 643 on the loans that were put back. This changed abruptly for 2009 originations. In that year, while the average FICO score for put-back and defaulted loans was lower than the overall universe, the average FICO score for repurchased loans was higher than the average FICO score for defaulted loans.
